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Abstract: In this essay, I argue that sensibility-invariantism about ‘funny’ is defensible, 
not just as a descriptive hypothesis, but, as a normative position as well. What I aim to 
do over the course of this essay is to make the realist commitments of the sensibility-
invariantist out to be much more tenable than one might initially think them to be.  I do 
so by addressing the two major sources of discontent with sensibility-invariantism: the 
observation that discourse about comedy exhibits significant divergence in judgment, 
and the fact that disagreements about comedy, unlike disagreements about, say, 
geography, often strike us as fundamentally intractable. 
Consider the following scenario: 
 
Jane (27 years old) and Sarah (nine) are together on the couch watching an 
episode of Arrested Development.  While Jane thinks that the show is utterly 
hilarious and is, as a result, having a wonderful time, Sarah finds the show 
slightly confusing and is, as a result, rather bored.  During a commercial 
break, Jane turns to Sarah and says, ‘Arrested Development is incredibly funny!’ 
 
In the above scenario, Sarah will likely respond by saying something like, ‘I don’t 
think it’s very funny,’ a response that Jane will regard as an attempt to call into 
question her preceding assertion.  Given the circumstances, it is likely that will make 
certain concessions (e.g., ‘Oh… well yes I can see how the show’s humor is probably 
a bit lost on someone your age.’).  At the same time, assuming that Sarah’s response 
has not led Jane to wonder whether her being amused was owed less to the comic 
merits of the show than to some sort of distorting factor (e.g. her being more 
intoxicated than she realized as a result of her after-work cocktail), Jane will most 
likely dig in her heels as to the truth of her claim (e.g., ‘But trust me, it’s really quite 
funny.’).1 
 What I want to suggest in this essay is that the best way to make sense of 
exchanges such as the above is by understanding the truth-values of the claims 
expressed by ascriptions of funniness (e.g., ‘X is funny.’) as being in no way 
contingent upon the idiosyncratic sensibilities of some salient set of individuals.2  
Roughly speaking, the position I will defend in this essay is that an impersonal 
ascription of ‘funny’ expresses a true claim iff the object of that ascription is funny 
simpliciter, i.e. iff it is funny according to a sensibility-invariant standard of comic 
excellence.3  Along these lines, the sentence ‘Arrested Development is incredibly funny!’ 
will express the same claim -- and, in turn, possess the same truth-value -- no matter 
who it is that happens to be speaking (or listening4).5  In other words, what I want to 





I. Two Challenges for Sensibility-Invariantism 
 
Taken just as a descriptive claim about the way we actually talk, sensibility-
invariantism about ‘funny’6 seems to me to be on fairly solid ground. But, even if it’s 
true that, in everyday practice, we go around making (or at least trying to make) 
claims about what is and is not funny simpliciter, one might still have serious doubts as 
to whether this is a reasonable thing to do.  After all, to engage in such a practice 
would be to incur the sorts of realist commitments that come with engaging in any 
non-relativistic discourse, commitments which might seem, in the face of empirical 
observation, indefensible in the case under consideration.  For instance, if we 
interpret Jane’s earlier assertion, ‘Arrested Development is incredibly funny,’ as an 
attempt to express the claim that Arrested Development is incredibly funny simpliciter, 
Jane seems thereby committed 1) to the existence of some absolute or non-
relativistic fact as to whether Arrested Development is incredibly funny, and 2) to it 
being the case that anyone who judges (or asserts) that Arrested Development is not 
incredibly funny judges (or speaks) falsely and is, hence, mistaken.7, 8   
In Jane’s case in particular and in the case of discourse about comedy in 
general, the realist commitments just mentioned can seem highly problematic when 
one considers them in conjunction with certain familiar empirical facts.  For instance, 
discourse about comedy is, as we all know, a discourse riddled with disagreement.  
This can seem problematic for the practicing sensibility-invariantist, insofar as 
recognizing this fact of divergence in judgment will, given her commitment to non-
relativistic facts about comedy, commit her to the view that a large number of people 
are failing to perceive those comic facts correctly, i.e. that they have faulty senses of 
humor.  As John MacFarlane expresses the worry, ‘If there [is a] wholly objective 
propert[y] of funniness… then most of us must be defective in our capacity to detect 
[it].  We are humor-blind… in much the same way that some of us are color blind.’9  
And, this, as MacFarlane understands things, is simply implausible.  Or consider a 
second worry: many if not most arguments about comedy that people engage in in 
ordinary discourse are highly unproductive, suggesting that there is nothing that 
either disputant could do or say to (rationally) convince her interlocutor that she has 
made a mistake in judgment.  As such, the practicing sensibility-invariantist is, given 
her realist commitments, placed in the somewhat uncomfortable position of having 
to regard those with whom she disagrees in comedic judgment as being in error 
despite the fact that quite often it seems to be the case that there is nothing that she 
could do to (rationally) convince her interlocutor of that alleged error.10  This can 
leave the sensibility-invariantist looking like something of a dogmatist. 
To give a more general diagnostic, the worries about the reasonability of 
sensibility-invariantism seem rooted in the thought that, for all that it has in common 
with other non-relativistic discourses, discourse about comedy just doesn’t seem 
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sufficiently well-disciplined to support the sorts of factualist commitments that the 
practicing sensibility-invariantist incurs.11  While discourse about comedy is by no 
means totally undisciplined, it doesn’t seem, given the observed widespread divergence 
in judgment and prima facie impossibility of fostering convergence in a great number 
of cases, that the standards governing the discourse are so well-defined as to 
legitimize the realist commitments that the practicing sensibility-invariantist takes on 
board.  As such, even if it is true that we tend towards sensibility-invariantism about 
comedy in ordinary conversation, worries about lack of discipline might still lead us 
to think that this is a silly practice to engage in, and is one that we ought to abandon 
in favor of some more defensible, relativistic alternative. 
 In an effort to undermine this sort of concern about the reasonability of 
sensibility-invariantism, what I aim to do over the course of this essay is to make the 
realist commitments of the sensibility-invariantist out to be much more tenable than 
one might initially think them to be.  I will do so by addressing what seem to me the 
two major sources of discontent with sensibility-invariantism, both mentioned 
above: 1) the observation that, unlike discourse about more prosaically factual 
subject matters (e.g. furniture, geography, mathematics), discourse about comedy 
exhibits a significant amount of divergence in judgment, and 2) the fact that 
disagreements about comedy, unlike disagreements about, say, geography, often 
strike us as fundamentally intractable.  My strategy will be to address these worries in 
reverse order: first, I will argue that the perceived intractability of disagreements 
about comedy can be explained to a very significant extent by appeal, on the one 
hand, to a peculiar feature of the standard of warrant governing discourse about 
comedy that makes it especially difficult to rationally convince one’s interlocutors of 
conclusions about comedy via argument (section II), and, on the other, to a 
pervasive practical limitation that many otherwise perfectly competent participants in 
the discourse face when engaging in argument which further limits their capacity to 
rationally persuade their interlocutors (section III).  Second, I will try to explain why, 
non-relativistic facts or no, it should come as no surprise that we observe significant 
divergence in judgment about comedy.  I will do so by appealing to a variety of 
common distorting factors that can prevent even the most competent comedic judge 
from being amused by things that are genuinely funny (or, conversely, that can cause 
even the most competent judge to be amused by things that are not funny) (section 
IV).  In addressing worry (2), I hope also to further assuage worry (1) by providing 
additional explanation as to why it is so difficult to reach convergence in judgment 
about comedy via argument.  In terms of methodology, then, my aim will be offer an 
explanation of the two empirical phenomena that skeptics/(revisionary) relativists 
about comedy most often cite as justification for their dismissiveness of sensibility-
invariantism, an explanation that is entirely consistent with there being absolute or 
non-relativistic facts about what is and is not funny.  Thus, while I offer nothing like 
a deductive argument for the correctness of sensibility-invariantism about comedy, 
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II. Explaining Seeming Intractability: The Limits of Testimony 
 
One peculiar feature of discourse about comedy, and about aesthetic subject matters 
in general, is that the standard of warrant governing the discourse seems to preclude 
the possibility of warrant transmission via testimony.  Whereas discourse about 
prosaically factual subject matter appears to allow for an individual to become 
warranted in believing that p on the basis of testimony that p alone (e.g. typically we 
accept that an individual can come to know that the keys are on the shelf or that the 
coffee shop opens at 7 AM if she hears that this is so from a reliable source), when 
the conversation turns to comedy, or aesthetics generally, testimony that p appears 
never to suffice by itself for an individual to be warranted in believing that p.  Call 
this the No Warrant Transmission via Testimony restriction, or NWTT.  
 
 
Evidence for NWTT 
 
Whatever the underlying rationale for such a restriction might be, a quick look at 
speakers’ intuitions suggests quite strongly that NWTT is firmly in place when we 
engage in discussions of matters comedic (and, more generally, aesthetic).  For 
instance, suppose that Bob goes to see some new comedic film and reports back to 
his friend David that it ‘isn’t funny at all.’  Given that David has yet to see the film 
for himself, even if he takes Bob to be a reliable comedic judge, it would seem to us 
both bizarre and inappropriate for David to come away from their exchange having 
formed an unqualified belief that the film in question isn’t funny.  Even if Bob were 
to supplement this testimony by citing his various reasons for regarding the film as 
unfunny (e.g. ‘The jokes are incredibly formulaic and uninspired,’ ‘The actors have 
no sense of comedic timing whatsoever,’ etc.), it still seems that, by our lights, David 
would be in no position to judge, without qualification, that the film is of poor comic 
merits.12  This is why, for example, if David were to encounter another friend 
moments later who was considering whether to see the film, it would strike us as 
inappropriate for David to discourage his friend by saying, ‘Don’t waste your time.  
That movie isn’t funny at all.’ 13  While some sort of weaker discouraging remark 
might be perfectly in order (e.g. ‘I hear it’s not very funny,’ ‘The jokes are supposed 
to be incredibly formulaic’), because his only evidence concerning the film’s comic 
merits is testimonial in nature, David is, intuitively, in no position to make an 
unqualified claim about whether the film is funny.  Cases of this sort are easily 
reproduced, and moreover, producing cases where it would seem appropriate for a 
speaker to make an unqualified assertion of the form ‘X is funny’ without her ever 
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having directly observed X or a sufficiently similar reproduction seems next to 
impossible.14 
 Now, to say that we never treat testimony by itself as an adequate basis for a 
warranted belief as to whether something is or is not funny is not to say that we treat 
testimonial reports about comedy as devoid of epistemic value altogether.  To the 
contrary, so long as he takes Bob to be a competent comedic judge, David will 
(reasonably, by our lights15) be inclined to attribute to Bob’s testimony at least some 
evidentiary significance.  Depending on how strongly he trusts Bob’s opinion on 
such matters and on what else he has heard or read about the film from other 
sources, David might (reasonably, by our lights) take Bob’s testimony to license him 
to form some sort of probabilistic judgment concerning the films comic merits (e.g. 
he might judge that the film ‘probably isn’t very funny’).  Further still, if, as time 
passes, David encounters other seemingly competent comedic judges who 
corroborate Bob’s negative appraisal (e.g. the New York Times film critic judges the 
film to be ‘utterly unfunny,’ describing its humor as ‘terribly hackneyed’), David will 
(again, reasonably, by our lights) feel warranted in forming stronger and stronger 
probabilistic judgments concerning the film’s comic merits (e.g. ‘the film is almost 
certainly terrible’).  All the same, until he has taken the time to see the film for 
himself, David will (insofar as behaves in a fashion that we deem reasonable) abstain 
from judging without qualification whether the film is funny. 
Now consider a slightly different scenario: this time Bob and David have just 
returned together from a screening of a different film and are sitting down over 
coffee to share their thoughts.  Finding it a great deal better than the previous film, 
Bob confidently asserts, ‘That film was absolutely hilarious.’16  This time, however, 
David responds not with a trusting nod, but, rather, with slight disbelief.  ‘Really?’ he 
asks, ‘I didn’t think that was all that funny.’  Suppose again that David regards Bob 
as having an excellent sense of humor and takes his opinions about comedy to have 
epistemic value.  All the same, given that the film failed to strike him as especially 
funny, David is both a bit surprised by and somewhat skeptical towards Bob’s 
confident positive appraisal. ‘Why do think it was so funny?’ David asks.  ‘Well,’ Bob 
responds, ‘I just really appreciated how it managed to weave subtle cultural 
subversiveness into such a silly, outlandish plotline.’  After considering the comment, 
David replies, ‘I guess I didn’t really pick up on anything interestingly subversive in 
the film.  To me, it just seemed silly and outlandish.’  ‘Yes,’ Bob responds, ‘I can see 
how it would come across as fairly trite if you failed to see the subversive aspect.  
But, if you had picked up on it, then you would have realized just how brilliant the 
whole thing actually was!’  To this, David replies, ‘Hmm, I don’t know… maybe you 
are right and I just failed to see it.  Perhaps I just wasn’t paying close enough 
attention.’ 
 Interestingly, although in this case David has seen the film under 
consideration, it still seems that it would be unreasonable for him to walk away from 
the conversation holding an unqualified belief as to whether the film is funny.  On 
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the one hand, even if when entering the conversation David took himself to be 
warranted in believing that the film was not funny, Bob seems to have now 
presented him with good reason to call that initial assessment into question.17  If Bob 
is right, and the film really does have an underlying subversive aspect that David 
failed to notice, then David’s basis for regarding the film as not funny (e.g. it’s 
(allegedly) being merely silly and outlandish) would be undermined.  As such, 
although the film struck him as not especially funny, David is now in no position to 
claim without qualification that the film was not funny.18  On the other hand, even if 
David accepts that Bob is almost certainly correct, and that he probably did just fail 
to pick up on the film’s (quite real) underlying subversive aspect (e.g. perhaps David 
now realizes that he was very tired and incapable of devoting the requisite attention 
for picking up on features of the sort that Bob cites, or maybe Bob is just very stingy 
with praise and almost never lauds things which do not warrant it), it still seems 
equally true that David is in no position to claim without qualification that the film is 
funny.  Parallel with the previous case, if David was approached by a friend trying to 
determine whether to see the film, while it might seem perfectly reasonable to us for 
him to encourage the friend to go (e.g. ‘You should see it.  I think that much of the 
film’s humor was lost on me, but it’s supposed to be quite good’), insofar as the film 
failed to make him laugh, it would seem to us both strange and inappropriate for 
David to endorse the film with an unqualified positive assessment (e.g. ‘You should 
go.  It’s absolutely hilarious’). 
As this second exchange suggests, then, even in cases where a person has 
seen a film (or television program, comedic performance, etc.), insofar as that film 
failed to strike her as funny as she viewed it, according to the rules governing the 
discourse, that individual cannot then come to hold a warranted belief that that it is 
funny just on the basis of further testimony.  Just as in cases where one has yet to see 
the film under consideration, it seems to us that a person can reasonably regard 
testimonial evidence as a basis for probabilistic judgments concerning that film’s 
comic merits (e.g. ‘I bet it’s hilarious’).  Additionally, it seems to us that testimony 
can also serve the person who was not amused by the film initially as a basis for 
probabilistic judgments concerning why she failed to laugh as she watched it (e.g. ‘I 
was probably distracted’).  But again, in order to actually come to be warranted in 
believing that the film is funny, and, in turn, that her failure to laugh was owed to 
something other than the film’s poor comic merits, it seems to us that testimony 
alone will not suffice. 
 
 
Perceiving as  Funny 
 
Insofar as a person cannot come to be warranted in believing that a film (or 
television program, comedic performance, etc.) is funny just on the basis of 
testimony, a natural question to ask is, What further sort of evidence is required in 
7 
 
order to be so warranted?  At least in David’s case, the answer seems obvious 
enough: what David must do in order to be warranted in believing that the film in 
question is funny (let’s assume that it is) is to go back and give it another try.19  This 
is not to say that David must watch the film again just for the sake of repetition, but 
rather that he must watch it again in order to perceive the film in the right way, so to 
speak.  What is essential is that David sees it again and, because he now picks up on 
the underlying subversive aspect that escaped him before (thus ‘getting’ the film’s 
humor), comes to perceive the film as funny.20 
 While for David it is probably safe to say that watching the film again and 
perceiving as funny in this way will suffice for him to come to be warranted in 
believing that the film is funny (given his previous experience with the film, if David 
finds the film funny this time, it will, presumably, be because he now ‘gets’ its 
humor, i.e. he will be laughing for the right reasons, so to speak), this is not to suggest 
that perceiving a film as funny is a sufficient condition for being warranted in believing 
that that film is funny.  One can, after all, perceive film (or television program, 
comedic performance, etc.) as funny when it isn’t actually so (e.g. owed to 
intoxication, over-excitement, etc.).  And, insofar as an individual has reason to 
question whether a particular perception of something as funny is veridical, it seems 
that that particular perception would not issue the sort of warrant necessary for 
unqualified belief. What I am suggesting here instead is just that it is plausibly taken 
as a necessary condition on being warranted in believing that a film (or television 
program, comedic performance, etc.) is funny that one, at some point, perceive that 
film (or television program, comedic performance, etc.) as funny, i.e. that one is 
genuinely amused by it.21 
 
 
Is NWTT Rationally Defensible? 
 
At this point, one might wish to raise the concern that NWTT (and its companion, 
the striking as requirement) appears to lack any sort of rational basis.  In fact, 
amongst aestheticians that remain skeptical of these requirements, the principle 
source of their skepticism is the thought that there is simply no good reason for 
warrant transmission not to be possible with respect to comedy or, for that matter, 
to aesthetic subject matters generally.  ‘What,’ these NWTT skeptics ask rhetorically, 
‘could possibly justify a ban on warrant transmission via testimony in the domain of 
comedy (and aesthetics generally) when such transmission is seemingly 
unproblematic in other domains (e.g. furniture, geography, mathematics)?’22  
For my part, I would argue that NWTT is best understood as stemming 1) 
from the fact that in order to actively appreciate of a piece of art, be it a painting, 
symphony, or a sitcom, one must have a sort of first-hand familiarity with either that 
thing or a sufficiently similar reproduction of it23 (e.g. I cannot be awed by a painting 
that I have never seen, nor can I be made to laugh by a joke that I have never heard), 
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and 2) from the requirement that in order to be warranted in believing a thing to be 
funny, beautiful, etc., one must have, at some point, actively appreciated its humor, 
beauty, etc.  As for the aforementioned appreciation requirement (just another gloss 
on the perceiving as requirement), while I cannot properly defend it here, it is my 
suspicion that the rationale for this restriction has, at least in part, to do with the 
compatibility of non-evaluative descriptions of pieces of art with wildly varying 
evaluative properties.24   
Whatever one thinks of this or any other explanation/vindication of NWTT, 
however, I take it that the empirical data concerning speaker’s intuitions considered 
thus far amount to a compelling case that NWTT is a restriction that we observe in 
every day practice.  After all, even if one remains skeptical that there is any good 
reason for us to observe NWTT, such an individual will be hard-pressed to reject any 
of the examples presented above, examples which firmly support NWTT qua 
empirical hypothesis.  As such, even if were true (as I doubt that it is) that, as the 
skeptic would have it, NWTT is something that we would abandon upon reflection, 
given the data it nevertheless seems true that NWTT is a principle that we observe 
when discussing matters comedic.  And this, by itself, has serious consequences. 
 
 
De Facto Intractability 
 
If we accept that, as a rule, one cannot come to be warranted in holding a belief as to 
whether something is funny just on the basis of testimony, but must instead come to 
perceiving that thing as funny (or not funny, depending), then this is going to place 
significant restrictions on what one can reasonably hope to accomplish by way of 
argument with those with whom she disagrees in comedic judgment.  If I claim that 
something is funny and you maintain that it is not, and if the only way for either of 
us to (reasonably) become fully convinced of the other’s position is by observing that 
thing again, this time perceiving the thing as the other did initially, then, barring the 
conversation’s taking place in the presence of the thing being assessed (e.g. mid-film 
or mid-comedic performance) or one of us being capable of recollecting the thing 
vividly enough to allow for a screening in the ‘theatre of the mind,’25 the possibility 
of (reasonably) reaching total convergence will be ruled out from the start.  In other 
words, our disagreement will be a de facto intractable one, and the most that either of 
us could reasonably hope to accomplish would be to bring the other to admit that we 
are ‘probably’ right or, more plausibly, to get them to back down from their initial 
unqualified contrary assessment (e.g. ‘You are wrong, that film is funny!’) in favor of 
something tending towards agnosticism (e.g. ‘Well, it struck me as funny, but 
perhaps I was mistaken’). 
 As mentioned at the outset, these limitations put disputes about comedy in 
sharp contrast to a great many of the disputes that we have about more prosaically 
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factual subject matters, where complete convergence is a perfectly reasonable goal.  
If you and I are having an argument over whether tomorrow’s colloquium talk is at 4 
PM (the standard time, as I point out) or at 4:30 PM (as you contend), and you 
report to me that you me that you received an email just this morning announcing a 
schedule change from 4 PM to 4:30 PM due to difficulties with the speaker’s travel 
schedule, you will (at least in ordinary circumstances26) have given me sufficient 
reason to accept that the meeting is at 4:30 PM after all.  There is no need for me to 
attain some sort of first-hand familiarity with your email.  Rather, on the basis of 
your testimony alone, I would be perfectly warranted in admitting without 
qualification that you were right and that I was wrong, reporting to others that they 
should not arrive for the talk at 4 PM since it ‘is’ taking place at 4:30 PM, etc. 
 Still, that actual convergence is a reasonable goal in the one type of argument 
but not in the other does not force upon us the conclusion that disputes about 
prosaically factual subject matters and disputes about comedy are totally different 
beasts.  After all, while it is true that disputes about comedy will, often by necessity, 
have a lower ceiling on what their participants can reasonably hope to accomplish 
than disputes about things like what time a colloquium talk starts, it is not as if 
disputes of the former sort are bound to be totally unproductive.  As exemplified by 
the earlier exchange between Bob and David, at least some disputes about comedy 
are very fruitful indeed, with the involved disputants (reasonably) working their way 
much closer to convergence than they were at the outset.  Such productivity is nothing 
to scoff at, and is sometimes even a first step towards actual convergence (e.g. a 
conversational exchange might give the acquiescent disputant sufficient motivation 
to watch the particular film or television program in question again, at which point 
she may perceive it is as her interlocutor did). 
 
 
III. Explaining Seeming Intractability: Inarticulateness 
 
All of this optimism aside, one possibly lingering worry is that the imagined 
conversation between Bob and David, meant to exemplify the potential for 
productivity in disputes about comedy, exhibits a peculiarly high level of productivity 
for an exchange of its sort.  It is, after all, an unfortunate fact that that many if not 
most of the arguments about comedy that occur in ordinary conversation do not end 
with the involved parties approaching convergence, with moderate concessions 
having been made by one or both of the involved disputants.  Instead, a great 
number of these exchanges end in full-blown standoffs, with neither disputant 
backing down from her position in the least.  What are we to make of this disparity 
between cases of the familiar and frustrating sort and the less familiar but infinitely 
more satisfying exchange between Bob and David?  
 While disputes about comedy tend towards the unproductive for a variety of 
reasons, some of which we will address in due course, one very basic explanation for 
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why it is that so many people find themselves incapable of making the sort headway 
when arguing about comedy that Bob does in his exchange is that these people are 
simply much less adept than Bob (or David, for that matter) at sharing their reasons 
for regarding things as either funny or not funny.  It is a striking feature of their 
exchange as I have described it that Bob and David are both quite skilled at 
articulating their reasons for regarding the film as being funny and not funny, 
respectively.  This shared ability to articulate their reasons is essential to the 
fruitfulness of their exchange, since it is what allows them to pool and collectively 
consider the available prima facie evidence concerning the question of whether the 
film is actually funny (e.g. it is only because David is able to explain to Bob that he 
judged the film not especially funny because he found it to be merely silly and 
outlandish that Bob is able to explicitly call David’s prima facie justification into 
question).  By contrast, if, like many of us, neither Bob nor David were capable of 
saying much of anything on their behalf beyond reformulations of their original 
assertions (e.g. ‘You didn’t like it?  But it was so good!’; ‘I can’t believe you thought it 
was funny.  It was absolutely terrible!’) or self-reports of their respective affective 
responses (e.g. ‘I laughed so hard!’; ‘I didn’t laugh at all!’), then it seems safe to say 
that any conversation between the two wouldn’t be very productive at all.  And 
rightly so, given that in such a scenario neither disputant would be capable of giving 
his interlocutor much if any reason to call his initial assessment into question (e.g. 
neither could have successfully introduced any new prima facie evidence speaking 
against his interlocutor’s initial judgment beyond the mere fact that a seemingly 
competent judge disagrees, nor could they have managed to call into question the 
prima facie evidence speaking on their interlocutor’s behalf).  Because David takes 
Bob to have excellent taste in comedy, it is possible that David might take the mere 
fact that Bob disagrees with him as suggesting that there are worthwhile elements of 
the film that he failed to perceive after all.  However, if David is at all confident in 
his conflicting assessment (e.g. he perceives himself as having excellent evidence that 
the film is not funny, and doubts that he simply missed evidence speaking to the 
contrary), such a consideration shouldn’t cause David to waver in his judgment very 
much. 
To generalize: owed to the unfortunate fact that many otherwise perfectly 
competent comedic judges27 are relatively unskilled at articulating their reasons for 
regarding things as either funny or not funny,28 it is easy to see why so many 
arguments about comedy tend to be much less productive29 than the one between 
Bob and David.  Unable to offer up their reasons for public consideration, it could 
only be on the basis of something like felt peer-pressure or extremely high regard for 
the opinions of her interlocutor that one could be led by an inarticulate 
conversational partner to back down from one’s opposing view.  Barring irrationality 
or extreme deference, then, the conversation is bound to go (almost) nowhere, i.e. 





IV. Explaining Lack of Convergence: Distorting Factors 
 
While appeal to the two sources of difficulty discussed thus far, the ban on warrant 
transmission via testimony and the problem of inarticulateness, does help to address the 
second skeptical worry mentioned at the outset, that disagreements about comedy 
tend towards the unproductive and, hence, tend to strike us as intractable, nothing 
said thus far touches on the first skeptical worry, the fact of widespread divergence 
in judgment about comedy.  Even if appeal to these difficulties can help to explain 
the resistance that we face in working towards convergence in comedic judgment, this 
still leaves us with the question of why there is so much divergence in the first place.   
 What the proponent sensibility-invariantism owes us is an explanation of the 
observed divergence in comedic judgment that is compatible with there being non-
relativistic facts about what is and is not funny.  If the sensibility-invariantist wishes 
to maintain that it is actually reasonable for us to go around ascribing false beliefs to 
those with whom we disagree in comedic judgment (which, again, most of us do), 
what she must develop is a plausible account of why it is that so many seemingly 
competent comedic judges (as many of the people with whom we disagree are) can 
fail to assess things correctly on such a regular basis.  Towards that end, the 
hypothesis that I will be pursuing is this: observed divergence in comedic judgment 
is best explained by appeal to the variety of factors that can distort an individual’s 
ability to be amused (henceforth distorting factors) but whose operation often go 
unnoticed.  This unnoticed operation of distorting factors results in individuals 
frequently making faulty inferences from facts about whether or not they laugh at 
something to conclusions about whether or not something is funny. 
 
 
Environmental Distractions and Psychological Disturbances 
 
Standup is seldom performed in ideal circumstances.  Comedy’s enemy is 
distraction, and rarely do comedians get a pristine performing environment.  
I worried about the sound system, ambient noise, hecklers, drunks, lighting, 
sudden clangs, latecomers, and loud talkers, not to mention the nagging 
concern ‘Is this funny?’ – Steve Martin30 
 
As the quote above reminds us, one difficulty that we face as comedic judges is the 
variety of all too familiar distractions and disturbances that can easily get in the way 
of our being amused by something that we might have otherwise quite enjoyed.  For 
instance, if the person sitting in front of Susan at the movie theater is unusually tall 
and especially noisy, it will be very difficult for her to follow, let alone to appreciate, 
the comedic film being screened.  Even if it is quite funny, insofar as these 
environmental distractions are preventing Susan from devoting to it the proper attention, 
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the film in question is not going to make her laugh.  As such, Susan will be in no 
position to assess the film in terms of its comic merits.  Similarly, if Geoffrey is 
watching a sitcom on the heels of a heated argument with his spouse and after 
having just received some piece of terribly disappointing news, clever and witty as 
that program might be, it would be something of a minor miracle if it were to get rise 
out of him.  In the presence of these psychological disturbances, Geoffrey is simply far 
too preoccupied to be amused by much of anything right now, and is, as a result, in 
no position to judge whether the show is funny.31 
 While environmental distractions and psychological disturbances are similar 
in their tendencies to prevent individuals from being amused by things which they 
might otherwise find quite funny, one potential difference between the two is that 
whereas we, qua comedic judges, tend to be aware when things like excessive noise 
or occluded vision are undermining our capacity to be amused, the effects of the 
things like frustration or anxiety more frequently go unnoticed.32  Just consider the 
plausible extensions of the two cases above: in the first, it seems highly unlikely that 
Susan is going to form much of an opinion either way concerning the comic merits 
of the film that she is trying to watch.  Aware of her misfortune at being seated 
behind such a tall and noisy person, it’s difficult to imagine Susan doing anything 
other than (reasonably) suspending judgment on the question of whether the film is 
funny.  In the second case, by contrast, it isn’t at all difficult to imagine Geoffrey 
failing to recognize that his psychological distress is hampering his ability to assess 
the sitcom, and, as a result, forming the ill-founded judgment, ‘This show isn’t funny 
at all.’ 
 Now, I assume that it will come as a surprise to no one to hear that things 
like anxiety or frustration can lead a person to be unduly harsh.  When we are in a 
bad way psychologically it is, unfortunately, all too easy for us to form highly critical 
opinions about those things and persons around us.  Although Geoffrey’s feelings of 
discontent almost certainly reflect nothing concerning the comic merits of the sitcom 
that he is trying to distract himself with, it is not difficult to imagine Geoffrey 
unfairly blaming the show for his lack of amusement and dismissing it accordingly. 
Again, this should all be familiar.  At the same time, it is important to emphasize 
that, in the presence of disturbances of this sort, any wholesale negative appraisals 
that we might deliver are going to be decidedly ill-founded (and in a great number of 
cases, unwarranted).  This is especially relevant to the case at hand since when it 
comes to aesthetic judgment in general and comedic judgment in particular, it is 
often tempting to move immediately from the way a particular film, art installation, 
musical performance, etc. strikes us to the belief that the film, installation, 
performance, etc. is or is not praiseworthy.  And while no one should want to reject 
the thought that when it comes to aesthetic subject matters in general and to comedy 
in particular, initial impressions are excellent prima facie evidence concerning a thing’s 
aesthetic merits, cases such as Geoffrey’s should remind us that our initial 





Unfamiliarity of Content 
 
While the two types of hindrances discussed thus far, environmental distractions and 
emotional disturbances, serve well to introduce the notion of a distorting factor, i.e. a factor 
that can inhibit (or amplify) a person’s capacity to be amused and, insofar as its 
functioning goes unnoticed, lead a person to form ill-founded judgments about 
comedy, it seems doubtful that appeal to these two types of distorting factors alone 
will get sensibility-invariantist very far in explaining the full array of divergence in 
judgment that she is grappling with.  In order to give a more comprehensive 
explanation, then, the sensibility-invariantist must appeal to distorting factors that are 
far more pervasive and pernicious in their functioning than noise or stress. 
 A good place to start is with the sort of distortion that results from failures to 
comprehend the content of comedy.  A great deal of comedy consists in putting a 
humorous twist on events, experiences, or phenomena that both the performer and 
the audience are (presumed to be) familiar with.35   Yet, because the set of 
experiences to which a particular instance of comedy might refer is almost infinite, 
ranging from the nearly universal (e.g. romantic relationships, difficulties with family) 
to the maximally idiosyncratic (e.g. the personality quirks of one’s friend or lover), it 
is, unfortunately, a common occurrence that an otherwise cleverly constructed joke 
or comedic performance is lost on audience members who happen to lack the 
requisite background knowledge.  If Erin tells Sarah a witty anecdote having to do 
with the experience of bearing children and Adam happens to overhear, given that 
Adam has never beared children himself, it is unlikely that he (unlike Sarah, a 
mother) will find the anecdote amusing.  Even if we suppose that the joke or film in 
question is, in fact, quite funny, because Adam lacks the relevant life-experience, the 
joke likely to fall on deaf ears.   
 Parallel with Susan and Geoffrey before, it seems that, given his 
circumstances, it would be unreasonable for Adam to form a determinate judgment 
concerning the merits of the joke that either has just heard.  Because the jokes likely 
gave rise in him to feelings of curiosity or puzzlement rather than amusement, it 
would be both strange and inappropriate for Adam to come away thinking them to 
be funny.  At the same time, given he has simply failed to ‘get’ the joke, it would 
(given his apparent awareness of his ignorance) be almost equally strange and 
inappropriate for him deem the joke not funny.  Instead, like Geoffrey and Susan, it 
seems that Adam ought simply to remain agnostic with respect to the question of 
whether the joke was funny or, perhaps, to form some sort of probabilistic judgment 
on the matter on the basis of indirect or testimonial evidence (e.g. Sarah’s laughter at 
the joke, Erin’s reputation as an excellent joke-teller, etc.). 
 As anyone who has ever tried to explain a joke to a person lacking the 
requisite background knowledge can tell you, attempts at closing such informational 
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gaps generally yield middling results at best.  Erin, for example, is free to try to 
describe to Adam the particular pregnancy-related experience that her joke made 
reference to, but it seems doubtful that Adam will come away with a very thorough 
understanding of what it is actually like to be pregnant.  And, unfortunately, this 
makes it equally doubtful that Erin can help Adam to become capable of fully 
appreciating her anecdote.  In this case, probably the best that Erin could hope for is 
that Adam will come to think something like, ‘Okay, I think I can see why that would 
be funny.’  To hope for more would be somewhat fanciful.  Of course, there are 
informational gaps that are not nearly so difficult to close as those which require 
explaining to the uninitiated what it is like to bear children.  To the contrary, in cases 
where the missing information is fairly specific or otherwise easily communicated, 
one can reasonably hope to close the gap entirely, often without much difficulty (e.g. 
cases where all that needs to be shared is a very specific biographical fact about the 
subject of a joke).  Easy cases aside, however, owed to the frequency of cases where 
closing the informational gap is difficult if not impossible (e.g. trying to explain to a 
Chinese peasant what it is like to live in NYC, or to a member of the ‘Greatest 
Generation’ what it was like to grow up in the 90’s), it seems that one can explain a 
great deal of the observed divergence in comedic judgment, as well as much of the 
trouble that we have in working productively towards anything like convergence, just 
by appeal to the difficulties in understanding subject matter that we all face.  Because 
the set of experiences that a particular instance of comedy might rely on is, again, 
almost infinite, it would be absurd to expect even the most seasoned comedic judge 
to be equipped to understand each and every joke, anecdote, comedic film, etc. that 
she might come across, i.e. it would be unreasonable to expect any of us to have 
20/20 ‘humor-vision,’ as MacFarlane might put it.  Add to this the extreme 
difficulties that we face in catching someone up to speed when they lack an 
understanding of the subject matter, and it should come as no surprise that there are 
all sorts of jokes, anecdotes, comedic films, etc. that each of us, as individuals,36 
cannot and probably will never fully ‘get.’   
 Further still, appeal to these difficulties can also help to explain to a 
significant extent why it is that we observe systematic differences in opinions about 
comedy across groups (e.g. genders, cultures, generations, etc.37): because each group 
has a common stock experiences that are familiar to each of its members and 
potentially unfamiliar to non-members, it should only be expected that there will be 
intra-group commonalities and inter-group differences in what sorts of comedy 
individuals are able to appreciate.  That there are such systematic differences across 
groups needn’t force us into accepting relativism about comedy (e.g. this joke is 
funny for women, but it is not funny for men) insofar as these variations can be 
explained in terms of the differences in groups’ respective capacities for appreciation 
(e.g. women tend to get this joke, whereas men tend not to).   
 Admittedly, this still leaves us with the question of why content unfamiliarity 
might give rise to genuine divergence of comedic opinion as opposed to mere lack of 
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convergence, i.e. why those at a content-familiarity deficit might, as a result of their 
deficit, issue faulty judgments rather than merely suspending judgment in the 
relevant cases.  Three points on this: first, the ratio of divergence to mere lack of 
convergence across the population in general and across demographic groups in 
particular ought not to be exaggerated.  Jokes having to do with, say, the experience 
of women far more often elicit shrugs of indifference from unknowing men than 
they do outright dismissals.  As such, explaining mere lack of convergence gets us a 
long way towards making sense of the empirical facts that are supposed to make 
trouble for the sensibility-invariantist.  Second, it should be observed that there are at 
least some cases where it would be perfectly reasonable for a person to fail to be 
aware of their being at a content-familiarity deficit and to issue ill-founded comedic 
judgments accordingly; typically such cases involve humor that is reasonably 
misinterpreted by the misguided comedic judge as having to do with content other 
than what the humorist intends (e.g. a joke about ‘California’ that elicits a lukewarm 
response because it is reasonably misinterpreted by a longtime San Francisco resident 
as having to do with San Francisco rather than Los Angeles).  Third and finally, I 
would argue that most of cases of divergence grounded in content-unfamiliarity (of 
which there are a fair number) are owed to the unfortunately widespread tendency 
for individuals to dismiss humor that they do not ‘get.’  Going back to the example 
of female-centric humor, one can (unfortunately) easily imagine a less-than-reflective 
male (illegitimately) dismissing such humor purely on the basis that it does not make 
him laugh.  Such an unreflective individual would likely either reject out of hand or, 
more plausibly, fail to even consider the possibility that his failure to appreciate this 
humor was owed to his lack of familiarity with its subject matter and, in doing so, 
would demonstrate his arrogance and/or lack of imagination (which are the traits the 




Unfamiliarity of Form 
 
Just as a person must be capable of understanding the subject matter of a given 
instance of comedy in order to appreciate it, so too, I want to argue, must she be 
capable of understanding the comic form or style that it happens to take.38  Subject 
matter aside, if a particular comedic film or standup performance makes heavy use of 
comic devices that seem strange or unfamiliar to a particular audience member, it’s 
doubtful that this person will find said film or performance very amusing.  ‘I know 
that this is supposed to be funny,’ the puzzled audience member might think to herself, 
‘but I just don’t get it.’ 
 Take an example: suppose that Tom, circa 1974, has, on the advice of a 
friend, decided to attend a performance of the avant garde comedian Andy Kaufman.  
Although he enjoys a good laugh (who doesn’t?), Tom is no aficionado of the 
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standup comedy scene and has no real sense of the evolution that the medium has 
undergone over the past few years.  To him, the term ‘standup comedy’ connotes a 
very traditional type of performance consisting of a series of jokes in the standard 
setup-punch line style.  Given this limited background, Tom has little idea what is in 
store for him at Kaufman’s show.  Kaufman, after all, is attempting to turn 
conventional standup comedy on its head, and his brilliance as a comedian is rooted 
precisely in his ability to toy with and to flout the traditional comedic expectations of 
his audience.  Whereas his audience expects a comedy routine to be interspersed with 
punch lines, and, thus, with opportunities to release the building comic tension, 
Kaufman constructs his various bits to build tension to an almost unbearable level, 
denying his audience the relief that they expect, before bringing the bit to a close on 
something of a flat note (e.g. in one paradigmatic bit, Kaufman stands on stage with 
a record player playing the theme from Mighty Mouse, standing by idly except in order 
to lip-sync with great enthusiasm to one distinct line in the chorus, ‘Here I come to 
save the day!’  The bit comes to a close with Kaufman standing by as the record 
plays itself out39).  Uninitiated audience members such as Tom are thus left slightly 
puzzled once the bit has come to a close, thinking to themselves, ‘Wait, that was the 
joke?’ 
 Given his puzzled and unamused response, clearly it would entirely 
inappropriate (and, again, rather inexplicable) for someone such as Tom to come 
away from Kaufman’s performance thinking that it was funny.  At the same time, I 
want to argue, because Tom failed to make sense of the comedic logic underlying 
Kaufman’s performance, it would be almost equally inappropriate (though, as we will 
see, entirely explicable) for Tom to come away feeling confident in the judgment that 
the show was not funny.  Because Tom simply failed to understand Kaufman’s act, 
rather than dismissing it out of hand, it seems that Tom does best to remain agnostic 
with respect to the question of whether the performance was funny or, again, to 
form some sort of probabilistic judgment on the basis of available 
indirect/testimonial evidence. 
Just to summarize: to claim that understanding form is a prerequisite for 
appreciating some instance of comedy is, in effect, to say that in order to be in a 
position to judge whether something is funny, one must successfully identify and 
understand that thing’s underlying comedic logic.  Going back to the Andy Kaufman 
example, in order to fully comprehend Kaufman’s act and to understand why it is 
even supposed to be funny, something that is required in order to find it as amusing as 
one ought to, one must first have a sense of the standards governing more 
conventional forms of standup comedy, and, in turn, to see how it is that Kaufman’s 
act intentionally flouts those standards.  Absent that understanding, one will, like 
Tom, find Kaufman’s act only puzzling and/or bizarre.40 
 Important to note here is that, as with subject matter, understanding form is 
not a bivalent property but, rather, one that comes in degrees.  For example, if we 
consider Kaufman’s so-called ‘anti-humor,’ we can see that it is relatively easy to 
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describe and, thus, to come to comprehend the basic mechanics of the approach (e.g. 
‘Anti-humor is designed to toy with and to flout the norms of traditional standup 
comedy’).   By contrast, in order to develop an eye for the various intricacies of the 
form, and for the marks that separate truly excellent instances of anti-humor such as 
Kaufman’s from those which are merely mediocre (e.g. Kaufman’s use of the actively 
unfunny, as opposed to merely arbitrary or bizarre), a great deal more time and 
exposure will be necessary.41  As a result, whereas someone only minimally 
acquainted with the form will be able to appreciate Kaufman’s particular anti-humor 
act at a very basic level (e.g. ‘Oh, I get it!’), those with much greater familiarity with 
and comprehension of the form will be able to pick up on the subtleties and nuances 
that make several of Kaufman’s routines truly brilliant (e.g. ‘What a genius!’).  And, 
as a result, while for the minimally acquainted, all instances of anti-humor tend to 
seem alike and, hence, prove equally amusing, for the connoisseur, some routines 
evoke uncontrollable laughter while others barely give rise to a chuckle.42 
 Reminding ourselves that those with only a minimal grasp of a particular 
comic device find themselves incapable of distinguishing between excellent and 
mediocre instantiations of that device is helpful for the purposes at hand, since 
appeal to that phenomenon can, it seems, be used to explain a relatively significant 
portion of observed divergence in comedic judgment.  For example, consider a 
slightly more familiar comedic device: sarcasm.  As with anti-humor, the basic 
mechanics of sarcasm are easy enough to explain (e.g. ‘Sarcasm is the use of ironic 
statements to express disdain in the guise of approval’).  However, as anyone who 
has ever interacted with a young child can tell you, the mere grasp of these basic 
mechanics does not suffice to enable an individual to distinguish between thoughtful, 
amusing sarcastic remarks and other less-thoughtful, highly obnoxious ones.  Given 
her very minimal grasp of the device, for the young child nearly any use of sarcasm 
(e.g. Jack, to the young girl wearing an outmoded hand-me-down blouse: ‘Nice shirt, 
Agnes!’) will strike her as positively hilarious, warranting the utmost praise (e.g. ‘That 
was so funny!’).   This willingness to praise nearly any and every sarcastic remark 
stands in stark contrast to the dispositions to praise of those of us with a more 
sophisticated understanding of the device and, hence, with more discriminating 
tastes.  While someone well-versed in sarcasm can see what it is about the obnoxious 
comment that makes the child laugh (e.g. that it makes use of irony), she can also see 
that this particular comment lacks the subtleties and nuances required for a sarcastic 
remark to warrant the sort of extreme praise that young child is willing to dole out in 
this (and every other) case. 
 Again, understanding of form is something that comes in degrees, ranging 
from minimal, child-like understanding to absolute connoisseurship.  The point here 
is just that the greater a person’s grasp of a particular form, the greater her ability to 
discriminate between better and worse instantiations of it, i.e. the better her ability to 
distinguish between the truly hilarious, the mildly amusing, the actively unfunny, etc.  
And, insofar as degrees of comprehension of comic devices such as sarcasm or anti-
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humor range across the population from the minimal or non-existent to the 
comprehensive, it should come as no surprise that dispositions to be amused vary 
across the population accordingly.  If we are trying to determine why is it that some 
find absurdist anti-humor hilarious while others don’t find it amusing it all, one 
plausible explanation is simply that some people have come to grasp the form while 
others have not.43 Alternatively, if querying why it is that adolescent males are 
disposed to laugh at nearly any joke having to do with bodily functions, whereas 
others are disposed to laugh only at a select few, one available explanation is just that 
those with a more thorough understanding of that particular comic device realize 
that not all bodily function jokes are created equally (something that most adolescent 
males have yet to realize).  As far as I can tell, these two models of explanation 
generalize quite readily.44 
 
 
(Un)awareness of One’s Ignorance 
 
As with the distorting factors discussed before it, a failure to (fully) grasp a thing’s 
comic form will only lead an individual to mistakenly judge that thing to be not 
funny (or funny, depending) insofar as she is unaware of that failure.  As we saw 
earlier, although Tom did not find Andy Kaufman’s performance to be very 
amusing, because he had a sense that he did not really understand the act, Tom 
(reasonably) was not inclined to infer from his lack of amusement to the conclusion 
that Kaufman’s act was not funny.  To have made that error, Tom would have had 
to fail to be aware of his ignorance, (mistakenly) taking himself to be in a good 
position to assess the act. 
 Admittedly it is difficult to imagine conditions in which it would be excusable 
for someone in a position like Tom’s to fail to be aware of his or her being in no 
position to assess the merits of the humor that he is confronted with.  Be that as it 
may, what I want to point out here is that there are at least some situations in which 
even a reasonable, generally competent comedic judge can fall prey to this type of 
error.  For example, suppose that Rita, on the advice of a friend, sits down to watch 
an episode of the satirical news talk show The Colbert Report.  As the show begins, Rita 
listens to the host, Stephen Colbert, open with what is ostensibly a racist joke 
portraying Mexican immigrants as a ‘scourge on America.’  Seeing as this is Rita’s 
first encounter with The Colbert Report, and as the friend who advised Rita to watch 
did not alert her to the show’s satirical character, Rita (not unreasonably) interprets 
Colbert as delivering this racist joke in earnest and, accordingly, deems it to be 
decidedly unfunny.45  What Rita fails to realize is that Colbert is delivering the joke 
not as an expression an irrational hatred of Mexican immigrants, but, rather, as a way 
of parodying various right-wing political pundits who genuinely hold and earnestly 
espouse such racist views.  As such, by (understandably) failing to detect the satire, 
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Rita not only fails to understand the form of the joke, but actually misunderstands it 





What Rita’s case highlights, then, is that there are at least some situations where the 
problem of misunderstanding comic form can befall even the most reasonable 
comedic judge.  When a comedian employs incredibly subtle sarcasm or irony, for 
example, it is possible for an individual to fail to pick up on that aspect of the 
performance through no serious fault of her own.  And if, in addition, that 
comedian’s performance is readily intelligible as an attempt at comedy even when 
(mis)understood as containing no irony or sarcasm whatsoever (e.g. a standup 
comedian parodying an incredibly hacky standup comedian), then even a perfectly 
reasonable and competent comedic judge might misunderstand the performance 
entirely, evaluating it incorrectly in turn.  
 Unfortunately, in actual practice the problem of misidentification of form 
(and, hence, disagreement in comedic judgment) is far more pervasive than it would 
be if we were all perfectly reasonable comedic judges.  Turning back to Tom’s case, 
because the Kaufman performance that he watches (which Tom knows is supposed 
to be funny, mind you) bears no significant resemblance whatsoever to the more 
conventional form of standup comedy that Tom is familiar with, it would be 
inexcusable for Tom to misidentify Kaufman’s performance as an attempt at 
conventional standup comedy, assessing it (harshly) accordingly.  Kaufman’s 
performance is transparently not a conventional standup performance, so to judge it 
negatively because it fails to exhibit the marks of a good conventional standup 
performance would be inappropriate.  Thankfully, as I have described him, Tom is 
reasonable enough to avoid this sort of error.  Instead of trying to assess the 
performance in the light of an obviously ill-fitting standard, Tom does the 
appropriate thing and suspends judgment on the question of whether Kaufman’s 
performance is funny. 
But not all comedic judges are nearly as reasonable as Tom.  To the contrary, 
it is quite common to encounter individuals who, to varying degrees, go around 
assessing the comic merits of any and all instances of comedy that they come across 
according the comic standards appropriate to the limited range of comic forms with 
which they are familiar.  These closed-minded individuals feel confident in applying the 
standards that they are familiar with even in cases where a minimal amount of 
reflection would make it apparent that those standards fail to apply in the case at 
hand.  For example, someone equally unacquainted with avant-garde comedy but a 
great deal less reasonable than Tom might decide to evaluate Kaufman’s 
performance (harshly) according to the standards of excellence with which she is 
familiar.  Such a person would then infer from the act’s failure to make her laugh to 
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the conclusion that the performance isn’t funny.  Rather than taking the fact that 
Kaufman’s performance makes no discernable effort at meeting the standards of 
comic excellence that she is familiar with as evidence that some other standard is, in 
all likelihood, more appropriate in this case, the closed-minded individual presses 
ahead, applying the familiar but ill-suited standards with full confidence, feeling 
warranted in dismissing the performance in turn. 
Important to realize here is that the problem of unreasonable dismissals 
resulting from closed-mindedness is not one faced solely by the comic avant-garde.  
Consider Ellen, a closed-minded aristocrat, who only has a real appreciation for 
incredibly dry, reserved humor.  If she is presented with a very clever but slightly 
low-brow comedic film (e.g. Stripes), one whose comedy is laden with sexual content 
and contains a fair amount of foul language, it is very likely that Ellen will find the 
film crass and vulgar, and will dismiss it accordingly.  Now, while it is true that a film 
being too crass or too vulgar does count as a strike against its being funny in any 
context, one suspects that the standards of crassness and vulgarity that Ellen is 
employing in this particular case are simply far too restrictive given the sort of film 
that she is assessing.  What Ellen fails to realize is that crassness and vulgarity, when 
employed judiciously (as they are in good low-brow comedies), can help bring about 
hilarious results.  Because she is not familiar enough with the comic form of low-
brow humor to appreciate its virtues, to perceive the nuances and subtleties that 
mark off truly excellent low-brow comedies from their mediocre counterparts, etc., 
Ellen simply lacks an eye for such films.  And while Ellen’s being unfamiliar with, 
and hence incapable of appreciating, low-brow comedies might not be all that 
objectionable in itself, Ellen is most certainly criticizable for her unreasonably harsh 
assessment in this case.  Specifically, Ellen is open to criticism for having failed to 
consider the possibility that other forms of worthwhile comedy might exist beyond 
the range of forms that she is familiar with.46 
Whatever the psychological origin of an individual’s closed-minded 
tendencies, be it a simple lack of reflection or the manifestation of a subconscious 
refusal to acknowledge that there might be forms of comedy that one fails to 
understand, i.e. an unwillingness to admit the possibility of ignorance, the 
problematic effects of closed-minded tendencies are obvious enough.  Thus, insofar 
as we wish to be reasonable comedic judges, avoiding the sorts of unwarranted 
dismissal that closed-mindedness tends to produce, we do best to adhere to what we 
might call a principle of open-mindedness: when considering something that one knows is 
supposed to be funny, but which makes no discernable attempt to conform to the 
standards of comic excellence that one is familiar with, then one ought to suspend 
judgment concerning that thing’s merits,47 given that one has, in all likelihood, failed 
to grasp that thing’s comic form.48 
What this principle of open-mindedness tells us is that because it is far too 
easy to fail to be amused by a particular instance of comedy because one lacks 
sufficient familiarity with the comic form that it instantiates, in situations where a 
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thing’s comic form is not readily intelligible, the reasonable thing to do is to suspend 
judgment, not taking one’s failure to be amused as (conclusive) evidence that the 
thing under consideration is not funny.49  It is my hope that this principle of open-
mindedness is one that most of us already accept, at least in principle, if not in 
practice.  Still, insofar as a significant amount of the observed divergence in comedic 
judgment can be explained by the prevalence of closed-minded tendencies, it is 
worth reminding ourselves that closed-mindedness is objectionable and actively distorts 
our ability to assess things in terms of their comic merits.  Hence, divergence 
resulting from closed-mindedness (of which there is a great deal) does nothing to 
count against the plausibility of there being non-relativistic facts about comedy. 
 
Confidence in our own assessments 
 
Having spent so much time discussing the various ways in which one’s comedic 
judgment can be led astray, one might reasonably ask at this point how it is at all 
possible for a given individual to have confidence in her own comedic judgments.  
After all, when one is confronted by a person with whom one disagrees as to 
whether or not, say, Arrested Development is funny, how is one to know whether she or 
her interlocutor is correct?  Ought she not to suspend judgment on the matter? 
 While the correct answers to such questions will vary case-by-case, it is 
possible to make a couple of general observations.  First, the above discussion at 
least seems to indicate that distorting factors will far more often prevent one from 
appreciating something that is genuinely funny than lead one to laugh at something 
that is not (with the one possible exception of unfamiliarity with comedic form, 
which could very often lead one to laugh loudly at fairly pedestrian comedic efforts).  
For that reason, it seems that one ought to retain greater confidence in one’s 
comedic assessments in the face of disagreement insofar as those judgments are 
positive ones.  Second, and more fundamentally, when determining whether one 
ought to downgrade one’s confidence in a particular comedic judgment when 
confronted with a disagreeing interlocutor, one must ask, as in any other situation of 
disagreement, whether the interlocutor’s conflicting judgment is plausibly attributed 
to one of the distorting factors discussed above.  For instance, if one is aware that 
the person attempting to cast doubt on the funniness of Arrested Development has had 
very little exposure to the sitcom form, paid very little attention when she viewed the 
show, or is simply in a grumpy mood, then one ought not to feel rationally 
compelled to downgrade to any significant extent her confidence in the funniness of 
the show in light of her interlocutor’s position.  On the other hand, if the disagreeing 
interlocutor is known to be an expert in sitcoms, has paid careful attention to the 
show, and appears to be thinking in a clear-headed fashion, then this ought to give 
one reason for pause. 
 More generally, then, what the above discussion suggests is that one ought to 
evaluate comedic judgments (be they one’s own or another’s) with an eye to the 
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factors that can lead such judgments astray.  In attempting to determine whether a 
particular comedic assessment is correct, one must simply ask whether that judgment 





The aim of this essay has been to defend the reasonability of our practice of making 
claims about what is and is not funny simpliciter rather than making claims about what 
is and is not funny for us.   As I mentioned at the outset, this practice can seem 
problematic insofar as our engaging in it seems to involve a commitment to the 
existence of absolute or non-relativistic facts about what is and is not funny and, in 
turn, to our thinking that those with whom we disagree in comedic judgment are 
mistaken.  Owed to the observed widespread divergence in judgments about comedy 
and the prima facie intractability of the corresponding disputes, these are 
commitments which have seemed to many to be indefensible.   Throughout the 
discussion I have tried to work against this sentiment by providing a variety of 
explanations as to why these two seemingly troublesome empirical phenomena need 
not be taken as counting against the plausibility of the sensibility-invariantist’s 
commitments.  No doubt, in order to offer a fully comprehensive account of these 
two phenomena one would have to cite additional distorting factors beyond the ones 
that I have mentioned here (e.g. the effects that mistaken ethical judgments can have 
on comedic judgments50).  Still, over the course of this discussion I take myself to 
have covered the most empirically significant of these factors, and to have 
demonstrated the structural features that distorting factors possess generally, thus 
paving the way for a more extensive account, should one be deemed necessary.  It is 
my sense that, in the end, most if not all divergence can be explained by appeal to 
such factors.  But again, that is an empirical claim, one for which I have provided 
only imperfect (albeit significant) evidence here. 
Whether or not one comes away from this essay completely convinced of the 
reasonableness of being a practicing sensibility-invariantist about comedy, my hope is 
that, at the very least, one will come away thinking the practice of making claims 
about what is and is not funny simpliciter to be a great deal more defensible than he or 
she might have previously thought.  As frustrating of a time as we sometimes have in 
trying to convince one another that, say, a particular comedian or television program 
is or isn’t funny, it simply isn’t true that the only plausible way of making sense of 
these frustrations is by appealing to some sort of skepticism or (revisionary) 
relativism about comedy.  Disagreements notwithstanding, it remains entirely 
plausible that some things really are just plain funny.51 
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1 Worth observing is the apparent contrast with a scenario in which Jane remarks, ‘Watching Arrested 
Development is so much fun!’  Here, in response to a similarly critical response by Sarah (e.g., ‘Actually, 
it’s no fun at all.’), Jane is much more likely to retract her initial claim, offering instead a much more 
qualified alternative (e.g., ‘Oh… yes I guess I can see how it wouldn’t be much fun for children.  It 
would be fun for you if you were older.’).  See Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009) (defending indexical 
relativism about ‘fun’). 
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2 On the other hand, the discussion below does not rule out the possibility that something possessing 
the property of funniness ultimately amounts to no more than that thing’s being such that a creature 
capable of amusement would, in optimal conditions, be amused by it.  Cf. Johnston (1989) 
(articulating a response-dispositional account of value).  All that this essay suggests is that, on such an 
account, ideally situated observers would, according to the conception of funniness that ordinary 
speakers operate with (reasonably, I argue), respond to any given instance of humor uniformly, i.e. that 
anyone, or, perhaps, anyone physiologically capable of amusement, given the requisite intelligence, 
information, etc., would be amused by something that is genuinely funny.  In this respect, the account 
advanced here is compatible with the view that, e.g., the appreciation of humor is contingent upon the 
possession of certain physiological sensitivities, but incompatible with the view that those sensitivities 
vary across persons in a way that would undermine the existence of a uniform standard of humor, 
compare McGonigal (2006) (arguing that variations in physiology render implausible the idea that all 
human observers ideally situated would converge in judgment as to what is and is not ‘delicious’), 
including variations across, say, different species capable of appreciating humor (though, for obvious 
reasons, I make only a limited attempt to defend the empirical plausibility of this last commitment), 
compare Hyman (2005) (suggesting that gross color concepts are species-centric); see also note 37.  In 
other words, according to the account advanced here, ‘funny’ is not an anthropocentric concept. 
3 Because ‘funny’ is a gradable adjective, it does exhibit a sort of threshold context-sensitivity, i.e. the 
features of the context of utterance determine how funny something has to be in order to count as 
‘funny’ in that context.  To avoid unnecessary complication, however, I will abstract from such 
threshold context-sensitivity throughout the course of this discussion. 
4 See MacFarlane (2007) (arguing that the correctness of an ascription of funniness varies according to 
the comedic sensibilities of the person assessing the ascription). 
5 Holding all other relevant contextual features fixed (e.g., the show’s quality has not changed 
dramatically between utterances, thresholds are sufficiently similar, etc.). 
6 And about most aesthetic predicates (e.g., the predicates that we employ when assessing paintings, 
films, music, etc.). 
7 Sometimes these factualist commitments are construed as at least potentially admitting of exceptions 
in cases of vagueness (e.g., Wright 1992).  While I do not think that they admit of any such exceptions 
(I doubt that ‘disagreements’ over the status of vague cases are real disagreements), this is not a point 
I wish to haggle about here. 
8 Here I reject the thought expressed by Wright (2006) and Einheuser (2008) that disputes over 
matters of taste do not involve attributions of fault.  To my mind, a disagreement that does not 
involve attributions of fault is no disagreement at all.  Additionally, it just seems untrue to the 
phenomenon to maintain that such disagreements do not involve attributions of fault (e.g., if I think 
that something is funny, and you maintain that it is not, I think that you are wrong).  
9 MacFarlane (2007), p. 1. 
10 As Ted Cohen (1999, p. 29) expresses the skeptical concern: ‘When you find a joke funny, you 
expect me to join you in your amusement once you have told me the joke.  If I fail, then once you 
have determined that I understand the joke, exactly what failure will you attribute to me?  You find the 
joke funny, I don’t.  It is not as if some argument or proof had been presented, with your following to 
the conclusion and my not.  In that case, the conclusion is something to be believed.  This is an objective 
matter.  My failure to join you is an error, or a mistake, or a misapprehension.  But with the 
unsuccessful joke, there is nothing to point to besides the joke itself.  You cannot show that the joke 
is an instance of something that must be acknowledged as funny, as you might show that an argument 
is an instance of valid reasoning.’ 
11 This worry is expressed most clearly by Wright (1992).  See esp. chapter 3, including the appendix. 
12 One possible exception would be a case where the testimonial account is so vivid that it could 
function as a reproduction of the film (e.g.,the description would allow David to imagine the film so 
vividly that it would be as if he had seen it for himself). 
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13 Here and throughout I assume that a speaker’s being in a position to reasonably assert that p is an 
indicator of her being in the position of reasonably believing that p. 
14 One might worry that what we’re tracking here is some sort of conversational implicature, such that 
in saying, without qualification, that such and such film is funny one merely implies that she has seen it 
for herself (e.g., Mothersill (1984)).  This seems wrong to me, if only because the alleged implicature 
does not admit of cancellation (e.g., ‘Arrested Development is hilarious, though I haven’t seen it myself 
yet,’ sounds quite bad). 
15 In the sense that we would think it odd and inappropriate for him to do otherwise.  This leaves 
open the question as to whether such judgments of reasonability are judgments that we could 
reflectively endorse, i.e. whether NWTT is rationally defensible. 
16 One thing to note concerning ascriptions of ‘funny’ (and aesthetic predicates generally) is that we 
often slide back and forth between ascribing ‘funny’ to things and ascribing it to specific viewings of 
things (the latter being marked by the use of past tense).  For instance, in the scenario above, Bob, 
having just seen the film in question, might have said just as easily that the film ‘wasn’t funny at all.’  
While this is an interesting phenomenon, for our purposes I don’t think it poses any sort of difficulty 
since, I assume, a viewing’s possessing a particular aesthetic property (e.g., being funny) presumably 
entails its objects possessing that same property, and vice versa. 
17 Here I will remain agnostic as to whether Bob’s testimony gave David a new reason to reconsider 
or merely made him aware of a previously existing reason to do so. 
18 Related to the previous note, I wish to remain agnostic at this point as to whether David was in 
such a privileged position before his exchange with Bob. 
19 One exception would be where David is able to recall the film (or just the salient parts) vividly 
enough to re-watch it ‘in his mind,’ making an additional trip to the theater unnecessary. 
20 Note that this perceiving as requirement is, in effect, just a restatement of the appreciation 
requirement suggested at the outset of this section. 
21 Walton (1993) argues for a similar perceiving as requirement with respect to our understanding of 
both humor and music. 
22 See, e.g., Budd (2003), Livingston (2003), and Meskin (2004). 
23 Admittedly, the notion of a ‘sufficiently similar’ reproduction is somewhat vague.  Livingston (2003) 
worries that this vagueness poses a serious problem for any form of first-hand familiarity requirement, 
though I fail to see how it gives rise to any problems other than potential borderline cases of 
sufficiently similar reproductions. 
24 Sibley (1959) famously argued that any non-evaluative description of a piece of art was compatible 
with that artwork possessing or failing to possess any given aesthetic property (e.g., being beautiful, 
funny, etc.).  And, while Sibley’s strong claim seems problematic insofar as the aesthetic supervenes 
on the natural, it does seem right to say that most non-evaluative descriptions of a piece of art that we 
would actually give (given the various practical constraints that we face) are, in fact, compatible with 
the possession or lack thereof of any given aesthetic property.   As such, it does seem that in order to 
know that a particular piece of art does or does not possess a particular degree of aesthetic value, one 
must have a more detailed understanding of that object’s non-normative properties than one usually 
receives via testimony.  This does, of course, leave open the possibility that an incredibly lengthy and 
detailed description of a piece of art might suffice to give one knowledge of its aesthetic properties.  
Such a detailed description, however, would probably suffice as a ‘sufficiently similar representation’ 
of the corresponding piece of art.  Whether detailed descriptions can or cannot function as 
sufficiently similar representations is, of course, a difficult question, but I doubt that it is one that can 
be settled a priori. 
25 E.g., if I describe to you what I take to be hilarious scenes from a film in such detail that you are 
able to replay them in your mind, then it seems plausible that you might be capable of coming to see 
them, and in turn the film, as funny, even if neither the scenes nor the film struck you as funny upon 
your initial viewing 
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26 E.g., so long as I have no reason to believe that the email message is spurious or has been 
superseded by a later email moving the talk back to the normal 4 PM time slot, or that you are lying 
and that there never was any such email. 
27 I take it that even those with highly attuned senses of humor can have difficulties articulating the 
features that they respond to when finding a particular bit of comedy funny.  Being able to respond to 
reasons is one thing, and being able to put those reasons into words is another. 
28 Perhaps as a result of the lack of widespread education in the comic arts, in combination with the 
fact that comedy, much like beauty, is something that can often be appreciated even in the absence of 
an explicit understanding of its good-making qualities. 
29 As Richard Moran has pointed out to me, it would be a mistake to say that all ‘productive’ 
conversational exchange concerning some matter of taste result in something approaching 
convergence.  For instance, even if nothing like convergence is reached, we might deem a 
conversation between two firmly opposed interlocutors highly productive insofar as the two gain a 
deeper understanding of one another’s position over the course of their argument (e.g., a dispute over 
the merits of some low-brow comedic film between two individuals with strong respective preference 
for high- and low-brow humor is unlikely to result in convergence; all the same, such a dispute may 
well aid each interlocutor in better understanding the position of his or her opponent).  It is for this 
reason that we sometimes (rightly) take there to be a point in engaging in disputes with those with 
whom we firmly disagree, even when we are fully aware that said dispute will almost certainly fail to 
result in anything like convergence.  Be that as it may, I doubt that this observation in any way 
militates against the thought that ‘productivity’ or ‘success’ in a conversation concerning some matter 
of taste consists in the parties getting closer to convergence.  After all, what is happening in the cases 
where two firmly opposed interlocutors have a ‘productive’ exchange is that the two are gaining a 
better understanding of the reasons their opponent has for holding the opposing position that they 
do.  In other words, what is happening in such cases is that the two parties are getting better 
acquainted with one another’s evidence.  And, while this pooling of evidence may not result in 
convergence (or anything close to it), the process certainly brings the two closer to seeing eye to eye 
on the matter in dispute (e.g., each interlocutor might acknowledge that there is a reasonable case to 
be made for the opposing side, and that, perhaps, the issue is less clear cut than he or she might have 
initially thought).  And, it is in this approach of convergence, I would argue, that the ‘productivity’ or 
‘success’ of their conversation consists. 
30 Martin (2007), p. 2. 
31 Bergson (1914) famously argued that laughter requires the total absence of emotion.  And, while 
this is most certainly an overstatement, there is a truth in the neighborhood, which is that too much 
emotion can prevent appreciation. 
32 Though, as psychological research on moral judgment suggest, we might not even be so good at 
being aware of the operation of environmental disturbances.  See, e.g., Schnall, Haidt, et al. (2008). 
33 The point here is similar to Hume’s (1757) observation that a ‘perfect serenity of mind’ is a 
prerequisite of a well-formed aesthetic judgment.  
34 Although the above cases remind us that various distorting factors can prevent a person from being 
amused by something that she otherwise might find quite funny, one mustn’t forget that there are 
similar distorting factors that can have precisely the opposite effect.  If a person is intoxicated, in an 
especially giddy or excited mood, or is heavily anticipating that something or someone is going to be 
hilarious, it will be easy for her to burst out in laughter in response to a joke or anecdote which she 
would (hopefully) otherwise recognize as being not especially funny (e.g., bad jokes told on a first date 
with a very attractive person).  
35 This is the type of humor that Cohen (1999) refers to as ‘conditional,’ in that an audience’s ability to 
appreciate said humor is conditional on their possessing an understanding its subject matter. 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                
36 That is, for each individual there exists a great deal of humor that she cannot and will never be able to 
fully grasp.  
37 These considerations also help to explain, in the extreme, why one would expect rational creatures 
with radically different forms of life (e.g., dolphins, Martians) to be ‘blind’ to the humor that human 
beings are well-situated to appreciate, and likewise why one would expect humans to be ‘blind’ to the 
humor that such creatures are better equipped to understand.  Indeed, insofar as such dramatic 
differences might preclude the mutual grasping of certain concepts, curing certain instances of such 
‘blindness’ could turn out to be impossible. 
38 My claim in this section is very similar to Walton’s contention that, in order to appropriately 
experience a work of art, one must have an understanding of the category that that work falls in, thus 
perceiving it as a member of that category.  See Walton (1970). 
39 Kaufman introduced this routine on the very first episode of Saturday Night Live in 1975. 
40 None of this is to say that a comedic judge must be able to articulate the underlying logic in order to 
appreciate it (e.g., I needn’t be able to tell you exactly how Kaufman’s routine flouts my comedic 
expectations in order to comprehend and appreciate it.  In fact, I needn’t even be able to articulate 
what my expectations are in order to do so). 
41 As Walton (1970) notes, ‘Perceiving a work in a certain category or set of categories is a skill that 
must be acquired by training, and exposure to a great many other works of the category or categories 
in question is ordinarily, I believe, an essential part of this training,’ p. 366.  Or as Hume (1757) 
remarks: ‘When objects of any kind are first presented to the eye or imagination, the sentiment, which 
attends them, is obscure and confused; and the mind is, in a great measure, incapable of pronouncing 
concerning their merits or defects. The taste cannot perceive the several excellences of the 
performance; much less distinguish the particular character of each excellency, and ascertain its quality 
and degree. If it pronounce the whole in general to be beautiful or deformed, it is the utmost that can 
be expected; and even this judgment, a person, so unpracticed, will be apt to deliver with great 
hesitation and reserve. But allow him to acquire experience in those objects, his feeling becomes more 
exact and nice: He not only perceives the beauties and defects of each part, but marks the 
distinguishing species of each quality, and assigns it suitable praise or blame. A clear and distinct 
sentiment attends him through the whole survey of the objects; and he discerns that very degree and 
kind of approbation or displeasure, which each part is naturally fitted to produce.’  
42 A similar phenomenon occurs when dealing with all kinds of aesthetic subject matter.  For example, 
some wine novices deem nearly all Pinot Noirs equally sumptuous (or unpalatable); some film novices 
find all non-narrative films similarly fascinating (or frustrating). 
43 Note that this does not preclude the possibility of a well-informed individual holding absurdist anti-
humor in ill-regard quite generally.  Such a person might argue that all instances of the form by 
necessity exhibit characteristics that count against their being funny (e.g., all anti-humor is overly 
esoteric).  Note, however, that this sort of criticism requires a thorough understanding of the form 
being critiqued (more plausible examples of a comedic forms warranting this sort of general critique 
would be offensively racist or sexist humor). 
44 The first type of explanation seems to fit quite well with things that are, as we say, ‘acquired tastes’ 
(e.g., satire, dark humor), whereas the second type seems to fit with forms which are more 
immediately accessible (e.g., slapstick comedy). 
45 Contra D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), I take it that a joke’s being conditional on a listener’s holding 
a mistaken ethical belief counts against that joke on purely aesthetic grounds.  This is why, I assume, we 
judge truly offensive jokes not to be funny (this is in contrast to Walton (1994), who asserts that we 
ought not to take such ethically-based aesthetic denunciations ‘literally’).   
46 One can easily imagine a parallel case moving from low-brow to high-brow, where a person familiar 
only with low-brow humor dismisses high-brow humor on the basis of its being stuffy and dull. 
47 Or form some probabilistic judgment on the basis of indirect or testimonial evidence. 
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48 This principle of open-mindedness is of a natural pair with Walton’s suggested features counting in 
favor of a work of art W’s being appropriately assignable to some category C: 
(i) The presence in W of a relatively large number of features standard with respect to 
C… 
(ii) The fact, if it is one, that W is better, or more interesting or pleasing aesthetically, 
or more worth experiencing when perceived in C than it is when perceived in 
alternate ways… (1970, p. 357) 
49 We may still wish to attribute some evidentiary significance to our failure to laugh, given our status as 
generally reliable humor-detectors, but not a substantial amount. 
50 As I mentioned before (see note 45), it is my position that an instance of comedy’s being 
conditional on an audience member’s having mistaken ethical views counts as evidence against a 
thing’s being funny (for sympathetic arguments, see Gaut (1998) and Moran (1994)). As such, I 
maintain that anyone who goes in for sensibility-invariantism about comedy is going to have to go in 
for some non-relativistic conception of morality as well. 
51 Thanks to Selim Berker, Nico Cornell, Kerstin Haase, Warren Goldfarb, Thomas Scanlon, James 
Shaw, Nick Zangwill, the members of the Harvard Moral & Political Workshop, and an anonymous 
reader for this journal for helpful comments and criticisms. 
